February
21, 2007
Department of Agriculture
Bureau of Dog Law
Enforcement
Attn: Mary Bender
Re: Proposed Dog Law
Enforcement Regulation #2-152 (#2559)
This commentary is sent on behalf of the Pennsylvania
Federation of Dog Clubs concerning the Proposed Rulemaking of the Pennsylvania
Department of Agriculture with respect to portions of 7 Pa. Code concerning Dog
Law Enforcement as published in the Pennsylvania Bulletin (36 Pa.B. 7596) on
Saturday, December 16, 2006.
The Pennsylvania Federation of Dog Clubs is an umbrella
organization consisting of about 100 dog clubs, humane associations and dog
training facilities with a total membership of over 4,000 people. Some members engage in participation in the
sport of dogs, competing in conformation, obedience, herding, lure coursing,
tracking, and many other types of competition, primarily at events run under
the rules of the American Kennel Club. Others
are pet owners who want to learn more about their breed, about dog shows, or
about training their dogs. Many
participate in breed rescue organizations, taking in pets that are no longer
wanted by their owners and finding them new homes.
Members of these constituent clubs are licensed as
kennels. However, as will be discussed
below, they are not commercial in nature.
They do not make a net profit and are not businesses under the
provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.
These are the quintessential hobby breeders. Proper care and treatment of animals is of
great importance to our constituents.
I have been involved in breed rescue as a member of my
local and national clubs, taking in dogs whose owners abandoned or abused them. I fostered them until suitable homes could be
found and then placed them in new, loving homes. I have chaired single breed specialty dog
shows and been assistant chair for all breed shows, as well as the President and
Board member of both types of clubs. I
have also shown dogs actively for almost 20 years and have taught conformation
handling classes.
Professionally, I served on the New York State Bar
Association Special Committee on Animals and the Law and was the General
Counsel and then the Executive Director of New York City Animal Care and
Control (NYCACC), a non-profit corporation under contract with the City of
GENERAL THEMES
There are several themes
reflected in this response, with comments discussed in more detail in the sections
which following.
1. Most of the regulated kennels and breed rescue groups
that rehome dogs within the Commonwealth are well served by the present
regulations. We support the Department’s
efforts to regulate better large, difficult to regulate, substandard puppy
factories, to regulate establishments that fall within the statutory
definitions, but have avoided regulation, and to implement licensing for rescue
organizations, especially those bringing dogs into the state. While the Commonwealth may enact regulations
more strict than those of the Animal Welfare Act, we believe that the
regulations as drafted will bring severe hardship to small kennel owners who
are hobby breeders not being targeted specifically by the Department for
increased enforcement.
2. Some of the new definitions create problems which did
not exist before, while other frequently misunderstood terms remain
undefined. The unanticipated
consequences of enforcing the regulations may bring legal challenges that could
compromise, or further erode, enforcement of the statutes.
3. The proposed regulations define processes and not the
ends to be achieved. There may be
alternate methods of reaching the unstated objectives both better than those
proposed and less onerous for the regulated community, especially the small
fancier kennels. This is especially applicable to instances where the Animal
Welfare Act provides significantly more reasonable alternatives for the small
kennel owner than those proposed by the Department. Suggestions are made for alternatives and
improvements. However, knowing more
details of the nature of the enforcement problems might enable us to make more
specific recommendations.
4. The Department has significantly understated the
costs of implementing the regulations for the Commonwealth, local governments,
the public and the regulated community.
5. Sometimes the regulations are internally inconsistent
and create standards that are so absolute as to be impossible to achieve in
real world conditions. They risk the
type of court challenge to the regulations and loss of cases that the
Department hopes these proposed regulations will, in part, remedy.
GENERAL COMMENTS
The proposed regulations were drafted with great thought
given to the health and safety of animals housed within the Commonwealth.
The Department has done an extensive review in an effort
to improve the clarity and enforceability of the existing regulations. However, there are a number of instances
where the proposals fall short of the mark.
At times, the proposed
regulations go beyond merely addressing industry changes, clarifying vague or
outdated regulations and clarifying the enforcement powers and duties of the
Department and its employees (36 Pa.B. 7596).
It would be helpful if regulations were written in plain English so
those regulated might understand better the rules that are being applied to
them.
When evaluating proposed regulations, it is prudent not
to rely on the good will and intent of those currently charged with their enforcement,
since those individuals change over time.
Rather the assessment requires a critical look at the potential for
misunderstanding of the drafter’s intent in the future should a less
enlightened administration be charged with enforcement. The problems with substandard puppy factories
and generic rescue groups bringing dogs into the Commonwealth are well known. Although there is little information accompanying
the proposed regulations to define specific problems, the above issues alone
justify some new regulations. Other
areas less clearly need the proposed regulations, especially those stricter
than the federal regulations. All the
reviewer is left with in those cases is the Department’s statement that new
regulations are required and that they will address the issues.
Part of the problem in assessing the need for these new
regulations is the lack of information on the specific instances of problems
needing to be addressed. While we wish
to accept at face value the assertion that these proposed regulations will
solve the Department’s enforcement problems, there is no evidence presented that
these measures will improve enforcement or that improving enforcement of the
current regulations could not achieve the same ends, especially with respect to
dogs raised in homes and small, private Class I kennels.
FUNDAMENTAL PREMISE
The proposed (and existing)
regulations attempt to apply standards suitable for the equivalent of a large
scale manufacturing environment both to puppy factories and to the workshops of
skilled craftsmen, experts in their trade.
The practices associated with the high volume, low cost “manufacturing”
of dogs for commercial sale to the public differs greatly from the methods and
care given to breeding and raising dogs by the craftsman whose breeding is
aimed at producing the best specimens of his or her breed. The craftsman carefully handpicks the best
family for each puppy in every litter. The
craftsman continually tests the results of his or her work against internal
standards and the standards of experts in the field. Whether the success of his or her craft is
evaluated for conformation against the Standard for Excellence of the Breed,
against objectively stated performance criteria in obedience or agility,
against training criteria and instinct in field competition or against other
criteria, experts evaluate the results.
The craftsman spends time analyzing
pedigrees, breed characteristics, performance abilities, temperament and other
factors before each breeding. Each litter
is part of an overall plan for the improvement of the breed. The skilled breeder who tests the product of
his or her breeding against the standards and practices of the breed is engaged
in a very different endeavor than the puppy factory whose goal is to maximize
profits and minimize costs while producing large numbers for sale. In fact, most breeders do not realize any net
profit from their endeavors – they are not truly commercial. Substandard puppy factories are more
interested in quantity of output, not in the quality of their product. The establishments of the craftsmen are the
Commonwealth’s first line of defense against substandard puppy factories
getting a monopoly on having dogs available to the public – and a lesser
quality puppy at that.
Small craftsman kennels, the people
from whom the healthiest and best socialized pets are obtained, comprise the largest
group falling within the scope of these proposals. They are not the group stated as the target
of these revisions, yet they are the group most impacted. Improved regulation and better enforcement are
needed to correct the problems in substandard puppy factories, but placing
undue burden on the craftsman does nothing to further these goals.
There is no requirement in the
statute, and none in logic, that requires the same treatment for all kennels
regardless of purpose. In fact, the very
inclusion in the statute of different purposes for operation and different
types of establishments presupposes that there may be different rules applied
if, in the Department’s discretion, such differences are warranted. Other jurisdictions take this distinction
into account; so can the Commonwealth.
DEFINITIONAL ISSUES
By
creating broad new definitions and more stringent regulatory requirements
without making distinctions among types of kennels, the regulations penalize
reputable breeders, while not doing more to protect the dogs in their care. Parts of the regulations are unclear as to
how they comport with existing law; in some cases they may be at variance with
such law, encroaching on the powers of the legislature. Some proposed changes may require legislative
enactment, if they are to be enacted at all.
In other cases, the authority of the Department to interpret the statute
to clarify its meaning has not been fulfilled
Some
of the changes may produce unanticipated consequences that make enforcement
more difficult. By creating broad new
definitions, the regulations may cover groups that the Department does not
intend to include in its enforcement efforts.
However, if the regulations are not enforced uniformly with respect to
those establishments covered by the plain meaning of the new language, the
regulations are open to attack from the very groups the Department hopes to add
to the coverage (see, e.g., Regulatory Analysis Form Answer to Question
14).
At
the same time the Department is creating new definitions, it has ignored areas
where neither the current regulatory scheme nor the statute provides
clarity. Another function of the statutory
purposes of regulations (“to carry out
the provisions and intent of this act.'' 3 P. S. § 459-902), is
to make clear what is regulated and how it is regulated. In significant instances the current and
proposed regulations fail to do that.
Let
us provide a few examples of how the regulations are unclear. The 26-dog cumulative threshold for licensure
is part of the existing statute. The Department has interpreted the
cumulative total to exclude some dogs on the premises. That is, in determining whether a kennel
license is required for an establishment, dogs that stop by during the day,
dogs that accompany their owners overnight, and dogs that stay overnight
without a fee are not counted in the cumulative total. In addition, a dog is counted only once
towards the cumulative total regardless of how many times the dog returns
during the course of the year. If this
is so, why is this not stated explicitly in the regulations to explain and
clarify the meaning for kennel inspectors and the regulated community? There has been considerable confusion about
this issue and the regulations are the place to clarify them.
The
rules on licensure differ for a boarding kennel (defined by statute as
“available to the general public” and “for compensation,” 3 P.S. § 459-102), which are classified on the capacity of the
facility, and other classes of kennels (i.e., private kennels, pet-shop
kennels, research kennels, dealer kennels or breeding kennels), which are
classified on the cumulative number of dogs housed in any year. Most people cannot operate boarding
kennels in their homes because of local zoning regulations, so compensation is
not a factor for them. If they bring the
cumulative total number of dogs to the 26 dog threshold for licensure, a
license would be required. The
Department is empowered to interpret the statute and if those dogs are to be
excluded, the regulations should so state.
The
definitions of kennels and the 26-dog threshold have been in the statute since
1996. When the kennel inspector comes,
he counts the dogs in the kennel and counts the dogs that are listed on the
required form as being present to see that they match. Each visit of the dog must be separately
reported on the Kennel Record. What is
someone to do if a dog that is there is not to be counted towards the total? It seems the choices are: 1) explain to the
kennel inspector the dog is excluded from the total and shouldn’t be counted,
although listed on the form or 2) don’t enter the dog on the form since it is
not counted in the cumulative total and explain why it isn’t listed. There is no way for the inspector to verify
the information to be sure the statement is true and to know that the
information is reported accurately or recorded accurately on the form. That causes enforcement problems. The fact that the regulated community, and
possibly some dog wardens, do not understand some dogs are not counted in the
cumulative total, suggests that its meaning should be addressed in the draft
regulations.
Licensing groups which are not, but
should be, covered by the regulations is a desirable goal. It will improve the health of animals and
provide better oversight. However, throughout
these proposals, the Department applies a broad brush of identical regulation
to establishments created for different purposes, housing different numbers of
dogs, and housing them in vastly different types of facilities. In trying to apply one set of standards to all
facilities covered under the regulations, the Department ignores significant
issues created by bringing new groups under the regulations in the definition of establishment.
The structural issues existing when a person’s home is
used as a temporary housing facility differ significantly from those where a
separate kennel facility, either indoor or outdoor, exists. Uniformity of standards is good when applied
to similar types of facilities. But it
creates unnecessary paperwork and creates misunderstanding when uniformly
applied across situations which are in no way physically comparable. Although it would more difficult to craft
regulations to address these differences, to do so might provide the Department
with an opportunity to more accurately direct its enforcement resources to the
areas requiring the most attention. It
would be well worth the effort.
One example might be to
clarify the relationship of the definitions of and the purposes for which
establishments, temporary homes and kennels exist. An establishment is defined as the “premises including the home, homestead, place
of business or operation of any individual or person .
. . which includes all of the land, property,
housing facilities or any combination thereof, on, in or through which any dog
is kept, bred, harbored, boarded, sheltered, maintained, sold, given away,
exchanged or in any way transferred. Establishment shall encompass all of the
individuals or persons residing thereon. It may be public or private and
includes an individual, person, organization, business or operation, which
utilizes offsite or temporary homes to keep, maintain, breed, train, harbor,
board, shelter, sell, give away, adopt, exchange, or in any way transfer dogs.” (Proposed Regulations § 21.1) The same section defines a temporary homes as
a “place, other than a licensed kennel or veterinary office, including a
personal home, land, property, premises or housing facility or any combination
thereof where an individual, person, owner or keeper, keeps, maintains, breeds,
harbors, boards or shelters dogs on behalf of another person, organization,
business or operation for the purpose of later selling, giving away, adopting,
exchanging or transferring the dogs.”
These contrast with the statutory definition of kennel as “Any establishment wherein dogs are kept
for the purpose of breeding, hunting, training, renting, research or
vivisection, buying, boarding, sale, show or any other similar purpose and is
so constructed that dogs cannot stray therefrom.” (3 P.S. § 459-102.)
In
order to be a kennel under the statute, you must first be an establishment
where the listed purposes are met and which is so constructed that dogs cannot escape. However, kennels are not licensed,
establishments are. The original purpose
of kennel licenses was to provide a way to license dogs as a group, rather than
to license them individually. It is
possible to be a licensed establishment without having a kennel facility. If you
are an establishment and have 26 or more dogs cumulatively housed there each
year, a kennel license is required. Clearly,
a person who keeps 26 dogs cumulatively in their house as pets and did not
breed them or engage in any of the other purposes defined for a kennel would
not be classified as such, although they would need a license as an
establishment. Thus, the Department is
placed in the anomalous position of requiring hoarders to obtain kennel
licenses.
The definition of establishment under the proposed
regulations appears to significantly expand the plain meaning in the
statute. Again, it is easy to understand
that defining this term more completely than it is in the statute is necessary
to permit the Department to enforce the statute with respect to individuals who
may attempt to avoid its grasp. But in
doing so, the regulations encompass groups and individuals with respect to whom
the Department clearly has no interest in including in its enforcement plans.
Unfortunately, in its attempt to provide measurable
standards for appropriate treatment of animals, the regulations require their
application to some settings for which they are inappropriate, for which no
clear basis is presented and which do not pass the test of real world
applicability. Furthermore, some of the
proposed regulations appear to go beyond merely carrying out of the provisions
and intent of the act. There are
internal inconsistencies and a lack of clarifying statements that make the
rules difficult to understand by the layperson that has to abide by them. Some of the opposition to this portion of the
regulations is derived from this misunderstanding, not from any disagreement
with the intent of the regulations to control better large, commercial kennels.
The
statute states that kennels are “so
constructed that dogs cannot stray therefrom.” (3
P.S. § 459-102.) It appears from
the statutory definition that there is something related to its construction
required for an establishment to be a kennel.
However, the statute and regulations are silent on the meaning of that
phrase. Nowhere is there a clear
statement of what differentiates a house from a kennel, requiring adherence to the
full panoply of kennel regulations. Does
the purpose of the construction have to be that dogs cannot stray
therefrom? Must the building have been
constructed to contain dogs or, at least, animals? Is it that there must be a fence around the
building or property? Does that mean
that an unfenced house is not a kennel, while a fenced one might be? If it is unfenced, but has a doggy door
permitting egress is it no longer a kennel?
The statute is not clear and the regulations should clarify the issue.
The Department correctly does not intend to enforce the
regulations against a hotel or motel that permits owners to keep their dogs in
their rooms. Nor do they contemplate
enforcement against cooperative housing or condominium developments. However, the new language appears to include
these groups within the definition of establishment in that the premises
include the “place of business or
operation of any individual or person
. . .
which includes all of the land, property, housing facilities or any
combination thereof, on, in or through which any dog is kept, bred, harbored,
boarded, sheltered, maintained . .
. .” Proposed Regulations §
21.1.
Hotels, motels and
campgrounds that permit individuals to place their dogs on their premises
overnight fall within the definition of establishment since the dogs are, at a
minimum, “kept” there. Therefore, if
they keep more than 26 dogs cumulatively annually, the regulations as written would
require they be licensed.
Hotels and motels that charge an
additional fee per room or per dog for permitting the dogs to be kept in the
rooms would be classified as boarding kennels under the regulations once they
meet the definition of establishment. If
dog owners go to such establishments to show their dogs in local conformation,
obedience, or tracking shows, to breed their dogs to a local dog, to go
hunting, or to deliver a dog for sale to someone local, dogs there for those
purposes would meet the criteria to classify the establishments as
kennels. At the least, the hotels would
have to require prospective guests with pets to let them know the purpose of
the pet being there so they could determine whether the keeping or harboring of
the pets fell within the regulations.
On their face, the breadth of the
definitions in the new regulations creates the requirement for their
licensure. The Department is aware of the recent experience of
Similarly, since the cooperative housing corporation is
the owner of the property, with those residing therein merely shareholders, if
more than 26 dogs are housed therein, it is an establishment under the
definitions and requires a kennel license.
The same applies to condominiums, since the individual housing
facilities, although not owned by the condominium, are part of the “of the land, property, housing facilities
or any combination thereof, on, in or through which any dog is kept, bred, harbored,
boarded, sheltered, maintained . .
. .” This is another area that should specifically
be excluded.
It is not appropriate for the
Department to argue that they haven’t regulated these groups in the past, do
not intend to do so, and will not do so in the future. In the past, there was no specific definition
of establishment in the statute or regulations.
By creating the definition as worded, the regulations themselves raise
this issue. Proper drafting of statutes
and regulations requires that they be drawn broadly enough to encompass all groups
they are intended to cover, but narrowly enough to avoid snaring within their
grasp those groups with respect to which enforcement is not contemplated. The Department should not state that it wants
to clarify the regulations and at the same time make them make them vaguer. The better course of action would be to
rewrite the proposed regulations so they more clearly defined the
establishments within their scope.
It is clear from its representatives that the Department
does not intend to apply the standards in the regulations to dogs kept in
buildings in which people reside (e.g., homes, hotels, motels or
campgrounds). If it is not, they should
be exempted specifically from having to adhere to those standards, most especially
with respect to construction-related items not suitable for a residential
environment. It is possible for the
regulations to make clear that if the purpose of the construction was to house
people, and if people actually resided therein, the incidental use of the
premises to house dogs would not make it a kennel for the purposes of complying
with the structural and maintenance parts of the regulations.
One
way to do this is to refine the definition of the term cumulative total. Section 21.1 could be further amended to
include a definition of cumulative total.
We believe the following is one way to accurately present the
Department’s policy. “Cumulative Total - the total number of dogs kept, bred,
harbored, boarded, sheltered, maintained, sold, given away, exchanged or in any
way transferred by an establishment at any time during a licensing year and
owned by any individual or person residing thereon. Cumulative total shall not include a dog
temporarily housed in the same room with an owner not associated with
establishment, or a dog kept temporarily without charge. A dog shall only be counted in the cumulative
total once year calendar year regardless of the number of times it enters and
leaves the establishment.” This is
only one possible example of wording that could clarify the meaning and clearly
exclude groups the Department does not believe should be regulated..
Similarly, the Department should not have any objections
to puppies being whelped and raised in a residential setting, even though the
houses do not conform to kennel standards.
People who raise puppies in their houses take great care to keep the
space clean, sanitary and as odorless as possible. The situation provides puppies that are
better socialized and more fit to live with a family than a puppy that is
raised solely in a kennel and has exercise for 20 minutes per day. Furthermore, some breeds require significant
attention during the first week of their lives and having them raised in a
residence is the best practice to ensure the health and proper development of
the dam and the puppies.
COST ESTIMATES
The cost estimates cited in the Regulatory Analysis Form
have ignored significant costs to the government, to the regulated community
and to the public.
I do not know the extent to which the Commonwealth and
local governments use dogs in enforcement of laws, the number of such dogs, or
whether some other statute exempts kennels maintained for law enforcement dogs
(bomb dogs, drug dogs, etc.) at the Commonwealth and local level from adhering
to the kennel (as opposed to licensure) provisions. However, the Department of Agriculture Web
site lists 27 currently licensed police-related kennels. Given the definition of establishment, the
plain language of the regulations referring to training as a purpose for
kennels, and the fact that they are licensed currently suggests that these
facilities come under their purview. Some
of these facilities keep dogs pending disposition, which may include
transferring the dog. Dog kennels
maintained by Commonwealth and local governments may not meet the standards of
the new regulations. Surely the
regulations do not intend that the Commonwealth and local governments not meet
the stringent standards set forth for everyone else. If this reading of the new regulations is
correct, these costs need to be accounted for or the regulations need to be
clarified.
The Department states that there will be no increase in
paperwork requirements. Generally,
governments assess the cost and time to the public as well as the governmental
entity when evaluating paperwork requirements.
This is specifically one factor considered by IRRC in assessing the
economic and fiscal impact of proposed regulations. The Department appears to have neglected the
fact that all kennels will have significant additional paperwork requirements
deriving from these regulations. The
Department implicitly has recognized this when it states that the on-going cost of
$5,000 per year per inspector for inspections and review of recordkeeping
requirements. Although inspectors may
not be creating new records, they are responsible for reviewing records
maintained by the kennels and validating their accuracy. The annual cost of this review to the
Commonwealth is included in the on-going cost of $265,000 annually for program
enforcement. It is not possible from the
documents to be sure that this cost is inclusive of the additional time, and
possibly the additional staff, needed to review the voluminous records mandated
by the new regulations. Therefore, there
is no way of knowing if this figure cited is accurate or too low.
Furthermore, the Department’s figures do not anticipate
the need to hire additional kennel inspectors to enforce its more stringent
regulations against what it estimates is a larger number of kennels than are
now licensed. If the regulations bring
unlicensed kennels that require licensure under its inspection program,
additional staff will be needed for inspection.
How it intends to increase enforcement without hiring additional kennel
inspectors and raising the estimated costs to the Commonwealth is unclear from
its submission.
The collective cost to all kennel owners is estimated to
be at least $5,000 annually and as much as $20,000 annually in the Regulatory
Analysis Form (Answer to Question 20).
Since there are about 2,400 licensed kennels currently in existence, the
Department is estimating a minimum average annual cost of slightly less than $2.10
per kennel per year, and a maximum annual cost of less than $8.50 per kennel
per year, which it says is based on estimates from the regulated
community. I do not know who within the
community estimated these figures, but they are low by several orders of
magnitude.
We are aware of one kennel that was already was built
when the new owner purchased the property.
It was constructed from blueprints for a commercial kennel and meets the
proposed standards inside the kennel, but the outdoor runs only consisted of a
dirt base. The new owner had concrete runs installed. They were sloped away from the kennel to
permit adequate drainage and a drain system was put into place to carry off
rainwater or water used for washing the runs.
The construction cost was about $8,000 for one Class I kennel, or between
160% of the minimum to 40% of the maximum total annual outlay projected as the
cost for all 2,400 licensed kennels.
This did not require any structure changes to the kennel building
itself.
Mandating construction to remove from kennels dangerous
conditions that might lead to disease is a desirable and necessary goal. However, the estimate of costs should be more
realistic to permit a better analysis of the cost of the regulations to the
regulated community.
Some of the other statements on the fiscal impact of the
regulations are difficult to accept on face value. For example, the Regulatory Analysis Form
(Answer to Question 20) and the preamble to the regulations estimate that there
will be no cost or fiscal impact to the general public from the proposed
regulations. (36 Pa.B. 7599) It appears
the Department believes that commercial boarding kennels will not pass these
increased costs on to the owners of the dogs boarding with them and that
breeders (large or small) will just absorb these costs without increasing the
cost of dogs sold. Most economists would
disagree with this premise.
Similarly, an unanticipated consequence of the proposed
regulations may well be a reduction in the number of small, craftsman breeders
and exhibitors who are unable or unwilling to raise dogs in the restrictive
kennel environment mandated by the proposed regulations, rather than in their
homes. The loss of these breeders will
reduce the supply of quality puppies available in the Commonwealth, enabling
substandard kennels to raise puppy prices to the public.
The loss of these exhibitors will have a negative impact
on revenues from dog shows within the Commonwealth, reducing funds available
for governmental operations at all levels.
In 2006, there were 620 AKC events, with
173,105 entries, and 146,855 competitors in the Commonwealth. An economic benefits
research survey conducted by the AKC asked respondents how much they spent on
lodging, gas, meals and other travel expenses. Respondents attending events
reported an average expenditure of $320 per respondent or a total of $46,993,600
in revenue generated by AKC events conducted in PA, in addition to the monies
received by local clubs and show sites for holding the shows. Dog shows are a significant income
producer for the economic health of the public.
The multiplier effect of a reduction in expenditures will impact all
public funding sources.
The Department itself recognizes only minimal costs to
the private sector for establishments utilizing temporary homes. While
it is true that the temporary homes will have additional requirements, this
statement ignores the costs to kennels of the other instances of new mandated
recordkeeping. Given the increase in the
amount and type of data that the rules require, larger kennels may have to hire
additional personnel and smaller, single or family owned kennels may be
overwhelmed. While this cost increase
will be a marginal economic factor for the large puppy factories, it will be a
major new cost for the craftsman kennels.
Furthermore, each temporary home will be required to have a separate
kennel license under the regulations as written. This will be a major cost factor for rescue
organizations.
COMPARABLE STANDARDS
Many of the proposed regulations, and specifically the
new standards for kennels, are derived from the Animal Welfare Act (7 U.S.C. §§ 2131 et.
seq) and its Regulations (9 C.F.R. 1.1 et
seq.), which were designed to apply to facilities engaged in wholesale
interstate commerce, not to the types of situations found in small, craftsman
kennels. Despite the fact that federal
regulations are frequently taken verbatim in the proposed revisions, there are
significant areas in which the proposed regulations ignore more reasonable
federal guidelines. This is, in
significant part, related to the Department’s approach of trying to establish a
single set of regulations applicable to all kennels, rather than targeting
regulations on a more specific basis.
The AWA serves as the minimum standard for those kennels included
within that law. States are permitted to
institute more stringent regulations over that class of kennels when they deem
necessary. The Commonwealth is free to regulate
other kennels more or less strictly, as it deems necessary. Different circumstances may suggest different
standards. By not tailoring the
regulations to the type of kennel, the Department seeks to implement the most
stringent regulations with respect to all kennels, rather than targeting those
area most in need of attention.
It is unclear from the Regulatory Analysis Form (Answer
to Question 21) or the proposed regulations themselves, why the Department
believes that more stringent regulations, rather than better defined
regulations coupled with significant enforcement initiatives, would not achieve
the desired results. Stringent does not
necessarily mean better or clearer and does not guarantee they are attainable,
even by a conscientious establishment.
Proposing unattainable regulations is the best way to make sure they are
challenged.
The federal regulations also provide existing operations
with a reasonable time period to come into compliance with the new regulations,
something that is strikingly lacking in the proposed Department regulations (see e.g., 9 C.F.R. 3.6(a)(2)(xii)). It was a relief to a see statement in the
Regulatory Analysis Form response (Answer to Question 30) that the Department
intends to phase in the effective date of the regulations for existing kennels
and to permit kennels which need to be licensed a reasonable time to obtain
such licenses.
Some of the physical changes to kennel facilities, e.g.,
construction of outdoor runs for both indoor housing facilities and outdoor
housing facilities, can be accomplished without changes to the structure of the
building. However, there may still be an
impact in cases where the local zoning board does not approve permits for
changes mandated under the new regulations.
A grandfather clause is usually included in building codes exempting
such buildings from compliance with new regulations until permits are required
for other structural changes in the building.
Changes to bring the building up to the new code are usually required
only at that time. To do otherwise would
place an unreasonable burden on the building owner. A similar practice exists in zoning
regulations which generally permit the continued existence of a preexisting
nonconforming use, while prohibiting new construction of similar types of
facilities.
The Department has the authority to treat different
kennel types with different rules.
Although not an absolute criterion, the craftsman kennels are usually
found in residentially zoned areas, while the puppy factories are on large
tracts of agricultural land. Regulations
could be written to apply appropriate standards to both types of kennels based
on the zoning and capacity of the establishment. For example, class I private
kennels (the group that potentially will suffer the most under the proposed
regulations and not a group targeted by the Department for increased
enforcement) could be grandfathered under the existing regulations or portions
thereof. This would enable the
Department to target better its enforcement resources to those areas most in
need.
Some jurisdictions define
kennels more specifically than do either the current or proposed
regulations. For example,, the
The Department could use a similar
approach to defining the term private kennel (which is undefined both in the
statute or regulations). For example, it
is within the Department’s authority to define a fancier’s kennel as a Class I
Private kennel under §
459-206 of the statute. The regulations
could further state that the construction and maintenance requirements of the
proposed regulations do not apply to Class I private, breeding or show kennels
if the dogs are kept in the home of the person operating the establishment. This would still permit the application of
the definitions to the other establishments, especially those constructed with
the intention of housing animals. This
is merely an example, not a well defined alternative. There are many such alternate approaches that
would yield similar outcomes. Where,
exactly, the regulatory line should be drawn is a matter of debate; however, it
should be clear that there is a need to define such a line.
Although instructive, neither the
Animal Welfare Act nor the Military Dog Training Manual is a suitable guide for
regulating private, craftsman kennels.
At times the requirements of the two information sources may be diametrically
opposed to the requirements of the proposed regulations. For example, The Military Working Dog Program, unlike the
proposed regulations, mandates that the sanitary inspection of kennel
facilities, the establishment of plans for kennel buildings and the
establishment of an adequate feeding program be performed by veterinarians. Department of
the Army Pamphlet 190-12, page 61. This
differs greatly from the restrictive and voluminous proposals specifying
methods of goal attainment contained in the proposals.
Our belief is that the purposes and intent of the act
would be best served by regulations based on the types of kennel licenses
authorized in the statute and the purposes for which the kennels exist. The primary purpose of a kennel may be determined
by the activities that involve the majority (or a large plurality) of the dogs
housed therein. The size of the kennel
is already known based on licensure.
Some regulations will be the same across kennels, others may be varied
depending on the type and size of the kennel.
It should be clear the Class I private kennels differ so significantly
from large volume, commercial kennels that identical regulations should not be
applied to both. The Commonwealth may
have good reason to implement more stringent kennel regulations, but where and
how the regulations impact on the different classes of kennels and different
purposes of kennel operation should be more clearly and flexibly defined. This would permit the Department to focus its
resources in a more targeted manner in the areas requiring the greatest
attention, thereby improving enforcement of the provisions and the intent of
the act.
UNANTICIPATED CONSEQUENCES
As the Department properly states “ . .
. rules and
regulations [are issued by the Secretary] to carry out the provisions and
intent of this act.'' (3
P. S. § 459-902). Most laws
rely on the voluntary compliance of the public.
Without such voluntary compliance, laws and regulations will not work
(Penn’s motto is particularly appropriate in this context –Leges sine Moribus vanae). It is almost impossible outside a police
state for the government to determine accurately the validity of such reporting
of non-public activities.
The requirement for a kennel license (“A kennel license is required to keep or
operate any establishment that keeps, harbors, boards, shelters, sells, gives
away or in any way transfers a cumulative total of 26 or more dogs of any age
in any one calendar year.” 3 P.S. § 359-206(a)) presupposes voluntary reporting
of the number of dogs by the public. To
the extent that regulations create overly burdensome or onerous conditions for
those regulated, those regulated will seek to be unregulated. Although the inspectors will be able to
prosecute those who falsify records under the regulations as proposed, legally
sufficient proof of the falsification is difficult to obtain and would take
significantly more resources than are currently available and significantly
more than the regulations contemplate would be required to implement their
enforcement.
Significant numbers of hobby breeders have kennel
licenses as a matter of convenience, not necessity. They never have a cumulative annual total of
26 dogs, but have a kennel license as a more economical way of licensing their
dogs. Other hobby breeders and show
kennels have licenses because they believe that it is desirable to have an
outside evaluation of their methods and operation, even if a license is not
required. It provides further legitimacy to their operation. Some hobby breeders and dog rescue
organization will be tempted to limit the number of dogs raised or saved in
order to comply with the regulations. Any
such changes in behavior would negatively affect Commonwealth revenues in a
manner unaccounted for by the Department.
In fact, the lack of clarity in the regulations is apparent in that the
term “cumulative number of dogs” used throughout the statute for licensing requirements is
left undefined and is variously interpreted and understood within the
Commonwealth. As discussed above, this
should be defined and clarified.
The following sections comment on the specific provisions
of the proposed regulations and issues arising from the standards and language
used in the proposals.
COMMENTS BY
SECTION OF THE PROPOSED REGULATIONS
7 P.A. Code
§ 21.1 Definitions. The
department states that definitions were added or revised to provide
clarification and that the “necessity for clarification is based on issues,
comments and questions which have arisen with regard to the Department's
interpretation of various provisions of the act and the current regulations
over the past several years.”
The
Department’s interpretation of the act is given great weight in defining the
applicability of the regulations. However,
in this case the new definitions appear to grant powers to the Department that
are not within the scope of the act or to broaden powers beyond that permitted
by the act.
The
expansion of the plain meaning of establishment also applies to the language in
the proposed regulations that implicitly includes breed and other rescue
organizations within the definition (“It may be public or private and includes an
individual, person, organization, business or operation, which utilizes offsite
or temporary homes to keep, maintain, breed, train, harbor, board, shelter,
sell, give away, adopt, exchange, or in any way transfer dogs.” Proposed Regulations § 21.1). The language referring to giving away or
adopting animals tracks the section of the statute which describes the classes
of kennel licenses (3 P.S. § 359-206(a)), but
is not in the definition of the term kennel.
The
terms “kennel” and “establishment” are used throughout the proposed regulations
in a manner that changes the meaning as presented in the statute and confuses
the distinction between the terms. There is a fundamental lack of clarity between the
use of the term kennel in the statute and the term establishment as used in the
proposed regulations.
There is no doubt that the
Department must be able to evaluate and inspect dogs throughout the
Commonwealth to ascertain the conditions under which they live and the care and
treatment they are given. However, the
statutory language “wherein dogs are kept” implies a physical structure created
for the purposes listed. By including
temporary homes (“A place, other than a
licensed kennel or veterinary office, including a personal home, land,
property, premises or housing facility or any combination thereof where an
individual, person, owner or keeper, keeps, maintains, breeds, harbors, boards
or shelters dogs on behalf of another person, organization, business or
operation for the purpose of later selling, giving away, adopting, exchanging
or transferring the dogs.” Proposed
regulations § 21.1), the regulation takes a group of people with a common
purpose and treats their private residences as part of an establishment and, by
extension, makes them into a kennel.
The phrase “or other
similar purpose” as used in the definition of kennel makes unclear whether the
homes, or portions thereof, fall within the definition of kennel since the
homes are now part of an
establishment. The regulations need to
interpret and clarify the “so constructed” language in the statute, or the
language needs to be clarified by the legislature, so that it is clear that
homes are not held to the all the construction standards of a “kennel,” despite
possibly keeping dogs for the purposes listed in the statute. A
family whose dogs are in their home and who have one or two females of a breed
that has large litters, may be required to have a kennel license, but not have
or need a kennel.
The
concern is that private homes will be required to meet all kennel
standards. Private homes are not
constructed for the purposes listed and, therefore, should not fall with the
definition of kennel with respect to adhering to the full range of kennel
regulations. To require that a person’s
home have impermeable floors, walls and ceilings, to have drains in the floors,
and to remove carpeting because it may harbor contaminants, is ludicrous on its
face.
This
appears more to be an attempt to remove pets from people’s houses than to
improve the health and safety of the dogs.
By clarifying the exemption of this type of housing from the full scope
of the regulations, you would allay the concerns of many owners of small,
private kennels that they will be required to adapt their houses to meet the
kennel regulations.
Individuals
who keep their dogs in their homes for their own purposes should clearly be
exempt from having to rebuild their homes to kennel standards. Those whose
homes are temporary refuges for rescue under affiliation with national or local
breed organizations and are established as non-profit organizations under the tax
code also should not be made to turn their abodes into full fledged kennels,
although they should be tracked and licensed.
Bona fide breed rescue groups
perform a public good for the welfare of animals and their homes do not become
kennels, except for licensing purposes, merely by joining together with others for
a common end. Furthermore, they reduce
costs to the Commonwealth, taking in dogs that would otherwise be housed in
shelters able to collect funds under the statute (3 P.S. §459-1002).
Finally, although
an establishment may be broadly defined as a residence or business with its
possessions and staff, it appears that the use in the statute is significantly
more limited than that. Under the
statute, dog wardens and others have the right to inspect kennels and dogs and
to enter into the premises of a person for an inspection (3 P.S. § 359-218). It is illegal to refuse dog wardens
admittance to do an inspection or enforce the statute’s provisions. The Secretary is permitted to enforce the act
by “all proper means” and for
purposes of investigation “[a] dog warden or employee of the department may enter into a
home or other building only with the permission of the occupant or with a duly
issued search warrant.” (3 P.S. § 459-901). It does not appear that the
statute contemplates dog wardens entering homes without permission or a
warrant. The proposed regulations, by
broadening the scope of the term “establishment” and by defining a “temporary
home” as it does, appears to authorize entry into a person’s home without either
permission or a warrant. This not only
violates the express terms of the statute, but may present the Commonwealth
with some Constitutional difficulties under the Fourth Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution. Warrants are obtainable in
cases where needed. The regulations
cannot and should not change that requirement.
The
regulations are also unclear as to whether the authority of the Department
extends to temporary homes in other jurisdictions that are used by a licensed
kennel in
7 P.A. Code
§ 21.4 Penalties. Language has
been added: with regard to the penalties associated with failure to license
when required; to clarify the powers, duties and enforcement options when
kennels are operated before a license is obtained; and to clarify the
revocation, suspension and denial language and the seizure provisions of the
regulations.
The
revisions under this section are generally useful, clear and reasonable in
their approach.
However
under subparagraph (1)(iii), the proposed regulations list penalties for “[f]ailure
to obtain a kennel license prior to operating any establishment that keeps,
harbors, boards, shelters, sells, gives away or in any way transfers a
cumulative total of 26 or more dogs of any age in any 1 calendar year . . .” The
problem with this formulation is that it is in conflict with subparagraph
21.14(a)(3)(i) which states that: “[u]pon reaching the cumulative total of 26
or more dogs of any age in any 1 calendar year, the establishment in question
shall be required to apply for and obtain a kennel license.” The proposed regulations require obtaining a
kennel license prior to operating an establishment reaching the size required
for licensure, but permits applying for a license once the cumulative total of
26 dogs is reached. The language of the
proposed regulation states on its face that they may be liable for penalties
covering a period when a license clearly was not required under the statute or
the proposed regulations. It is
unreasonable under the circumstances to require anyone keeping a dog to be
prescient in cases which skirt the border of requiring a license and hold them
responsible for operating an establishment when licensure was not required.
Furthermore, subparagraph (1)(iii) also states that it is
“unlawful for a kennel to operate without
first obtaining a license.” The
meaning of this statement is ambiguous.
Kennels are not licensed under the statute. There is nothing in the statute or regulations
that require a license for a kennel.
Licenses are granted to establishments that fall within the criteria for
licensure whether or not they have a kennel facility. This interpretation is bolstered by the
Department’s own proposed definition of establishment which includes temporary
homes that clearly may not meet the
criteria for kennels. This apparent
confusion is generated by the breadth of the Department’s proposed definition
for establishment, since kennel is defined in the statute as being an
establishment keeping dogs for specified purposes and constructed so they
cannot escape therefrom. By broadening
the definition as it proposes, it appears the Department may be extending the
term kennel well beyond its statutory basis.
This
section also needs to specify its implied statement that the penalties of the
section do not apply when a kennel license renewal, which has been properly and
timely applied for, is not received in a timely manner. Since kennel licenses lapse at the end of the
year, an individual would have no proof of current licensure even if assured by
the local office that it had been mailed.
The statute places the burden on the owner of the dog to prove it is
licensed. (3 P.S. § 459-802) We
are aware of cases where license renewals weren’t received before January 24,
2007. Should an inspector come to such
an establishment before the license was received, there would be no proof that
the establishment or the dogs were currently licensed. Even though the penalties in this section are
not mandatory, it would be better to clarify this issue.
The
requirements of (1)(iv) regarding convictions for animal cruelty with the past
10 years should be strengthened to include convictions for animal cruelty
outside the Commonwealth. The current
language does not prevent animal abusers from moving into the Commonwealth and
being licensed here. The Commonwealth
should not grant licenses to convicted animal abusers who were convicted
anywhere within the regulatory time period.
7
P.A. Code § 21.14 Kennel Licensure Provisions. This section gives more specifics with
regard to the intent and enforcement of the kennel licensure provisions of the
act and sets forth the substantive provisions of the regulations relating to
the new definitions of ''establishment'' and ''temporary home'' set forth in
these regulations. It addresses and sets
forth the prohibitions related to dealing with unlicensed kennels. It is intended to provide clarification
related to Article II provisions of the act and to assure greater compliance
with the existing provisions of the act to enhance the Department's ability to
carry out the intent of the act which is protection of the health, safety and
welfare of dogs.
The
requirement of Subparagraph (a)(3)(ii)
of the Proposed Regulations that each “temporary home utilized by the
establishment shall be treated as a separate kennel location” and the requirement of paragraph (a)(2)
that a “separate and proper kennel license shall be required for each type of
kennel and every location at which a kennel is kept or operated” creates a definitional problem. First, statute requires the licensure of
establishments, not kennels. It is the broad definition of establishment under
the proposed regulations that creates this situation. The Department’s
definition requires a license for each temporary home since they are kennels by
extension as part of the establishment requiring a license. This circular reasoning should be
eliminated. Dual licensure is not
necessary, especially since the regulations require the establishment to
provide tags for the dogs in the temporary homes.
Second, it is arguable whether rehoming an abandoned dog falls within
the catch-all phrase “or other similar
purpose” in the statutory definition
of kennel. The problem with this formulation is twofold. The purpose of rescuing, socializing and
rehoming dogs varies from the purpose of a kennel as defined in P. S. § 359-101, unless included under the catch-all
phrase therein. However, temporary
homes are defined so broadly that many may not meet the requirement of the same
section mandating that kennels be constructed so that dogs are unable to stray
therefrom. The Department appears to
mean that each temporary home is part of the same establishment. That, however, does not make the location a
“kennel,” to which other sections of the statute and regulations specifically
apply. The same concerns discussed regarding
the language under Section 21.4 above applies to the repetition in this section
of the requirement that kennels be licensed prior to meeting the standard for
licensure.
Subparagraph (a)(3)(iii) further states
that such a “temporary home that keeps,
harbors, boards, shelters, sells, gives away or in any way transfers a
cumulative total of 26 or more dogs of any age in any 1 calendar year becomes a
kennel and shall meet the kennel licensure requirements of the act and this
chapter. It appears the Department
means to say they become a separate establishment needing an individual kennel
license. If the proposed definitions are
to be taken at face value, temporary homes are required to be a separately
licensed establishment in all cases.
This is illogical. If they do not
meet the requirement of being an establishment requiring licensure by
themselves, they should not require separate licensure and be defined as
kennels solely because they are defined as part of another establishment under
the proposed regulations.
Licenses are required for establishments based on number of animals and
purposes for which the animals are kept.
The standards for operation of a kennel are discussed elsewhere. However, the standard for the size of the
kennel required in subparagraph (a)(3)(i) is arbitrary, capricious and an abuse
of authority in that it bears no relation to the actual housing needs for the
health and safety of the dogs. The
standard established is that “[t]he establishment shall have kennel facilities
that meet the regulatory requirements for all of the dogs currently on the
premises or to be kept, harbored, boarded, sheltered, sold, given away or in
any way transferred by the establishment, which ever number is larger.” Thus,
if a kennel has 20 dogs in permanent residence and has, over the course of a
year another 30 “ins and outs” (including puppies) the kennel would to be sized
for 50 dogs. This cannot be the
intention of the Department.
We believe what is meant is that “[t]he
establishment shall have kennel facilities that meet the regulatory
requirements for all of the dogs currently on the premises or the maximum
number to be contemporaneously kept, harbored, boarded, or sheltered, which
ever number is larger.” If this is
correct, it should say so.
This wording also requires that establishments that
utilize temporary homes, including breed rescue groups, must have kennel
facilities meeting the proposed standards even if they do not have or need a
kennel to function. If a group places 30
dogs over the course of a year in 30 different homes, why are they mandated to
maintain a kennel facility meeting the requirement of the proposed regulations? Similarly, why does a dog trainer who trains
one dog every two weeks for a cumulative total of 26 dogs need to build and
maintain a kennel when one is not needed?
Establishments that use temporary homes are classified as boarding kennels or non-profit kennels. § 21.14 (a)(3)(ii). However, breed rescue organizations clearly do not meet the statutory definition of non-profit kennel in the statute. “Any kennel operated by an animal rescue league, a humane society or association for the prevention of cruelty to animals or a nonprofit animal control kennel under sections 901 and 1002.” 3 P. S. § 459-102. All these organizations may enforce the humane laws; breed rescue may not. They also do not meet the statutory definition of boarding kennels since the dogs kept therein are not kept for a fee and the establishment is not open to the general public for boarding. In fact, although these may be establishments, it is only by a great stretch of the wording of the “any other similar purpose” phrase in the definition, and ignoring the “so constructed” language that they can be considered kennels at all. It appears that they do not fit within the purposes for kennels.
With respect to the requirements of subsection (b), does the Department intend to publish a list of individuals who should have kennel licenses but do not? If not, how is the kennel owner supposed to know that an individual falls into that category so as to abide by section (b)? If the Department with all its resources is unable to find this out, how can the individual? The more appropriate standard would be that the action is done with knowledge that a license is required and knowledge that it does not exist. Although this is harder to prove, it would better withstand legal challenge.
In accordance
with section 214 of the act (3 P. S. § 459-214), it shall be unlawful
to transport any dog into this Commonwealth, except dogs temporarily in this
Commonwealth as defined in section 212 of the act (3 P. S.
§ 459-212), without a certificate of health prepared by a licensed doctor
of veterinary medicine. All other
dogs entering the Commonwealth from another state, commonwealth or country
shall have a health certificate stating that the following conditions have been
met:
(1) The dog
is at least 7 weeks of age.
(2) The dog
shows no signs or symptoms of infectious or communicable disease.
(3) The dog
did not originate within an area under quarantine for rabies.
(4) After
reasonable investigation, the dog has not been exposed to rabies within 100
days of importation.
(5) The dog
has been vaccinated for rabies in accordance with the Rabies Prevention and
Control in Domestic Animals and Wildlife Act (3 P. S.
§§ 455.1--455.12). The health certificate must show the vaccine
manufacturer, the date of administration of the rabies vaccine and the rabies
tag number.
7 P.A. Code
§ 21.15 Exemptions. Dog control
facilities that are authorized to receive grants under section 1002 of the act
(3 P. S. § 459-1002(a)) would be exempt from the new quarantine and
space provisions of the regulations. The Department accepts that these
facilities perform a government service by taking stray and abandoned dogs from
the Department and the general public. In addition, they accept and hold dogs
seized from licensed and unlicensed kennels. Subjecting them to the quarantine
and double space requirements of these proposed regulations would limit the
space available to provide those services and limit the ability of these
facilities to adopt such dogs.
As a
former Executive Director of Animal Care and Control in New York City, the
writer understands well the policy reasons for the exemption provided to “dog control facilities authorized to
receive grants under section 1002 of the act (3 P. S.
§ 459-1002(a)) . .
. from the new quarantine and
space provisions of the regulations.”
Since the number of dogs coming into the facility is not under the
control of the facility, there are times when the minimum space standards and
strict quarantine cannot be maintained.
However, the logic of the Department demonstrates the validity of exempting
breed rescue organization in a similar manner and for the same reasons: “[t]hese facilities perform a government
service by taking stray and abandoned dogs from . . .
the general public. . . . .
Subjecting them to the quarantine and double space requirements of these
proposed regulations would limit the space available to provide those services
and limit the ability of these facilities to adopt such dogs.”
Although
breed rescue organizations may not be able to accept funds under the statute
and do not receive dogs directly from a seizure, in a number of well publicized
cases within the Commonwealth, they have housed and rehomed dogs originally
taken in by such dog control facilities when they were overwhelmed and breed
rescue groups perform the same governmental service regarding stray and
abandoned dogs as do facilities that may accept such funds. They also do this at no cost to the
Commonwealth. The same policy reasons
favoring exemption should apply to them.
Even though apparently not recognized by the Department, they are an
integral part of the system used to relieve the Commonwealth of the burden of
these dogs. Surely at a minimum, a
similar exemption could be included for non-profit rescue groups formed under
the provisions of Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code and affiliated
with a national or local breed club and they should be permitted to receive
pure-bred dogs of their breed directly from a seizure.
Of
course, it is somewhat ironic that the solution to solving the problem of dogs
seized from kennels which do not provide a healthy environment is to place them
in facilities which may have substandard space and inadequate quarantine
procedures.
7 P.A. Code
§§ 21.1 – 21.29 Generally
This
comment applies to all of the above listed sections. People’s homes and Class I private kennels
should have a separate set of regulations applied to them that acknowledge there
is a significant difference between these establishments and commercial kennel
operations. The nature and reach of
these differences should be developed based on discussions between the
Department and representatives of that segment of the regulated community. The goal should be reaching a mutually
acceptable set of regulations that will ensure the health and well-being of the
dogs kept by that group without imposing onerous burdens that might eliminate
this segment from meaningful participation in dog fancy. If that were accomplished, along with
clarification of some existing terms used in the statute and regulations, many
of the concerns of dog fanciers including those engaged in conformation and
performance events, would be addressed.
7 P.A. Code
§ 21.21 Dog Quarters. Language
added to this section clarifies the overall sanitation and housing requirements
of the regulations and to addresses the amendments to later sections of the
regulation related to sanitation and housing of dogs.
Subsections
(a), (b) and (c) appear reasonable. The
terms of subsections (d) and (e) appear to be inconsistent. It is not clear how an enclosure can be
stacked and still permit unfettered clearance out of the enclosure without
presenting a threat to the safety of the dog.
In fact, it is better for the dogs and the maintenance of the facility
if the enclosures are not stacked at all.
Perhaps this could be clarified.